投资者之间的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合

The Conflicts of Interest among Investors and Integration of Corporate Governance Mechanisms

本文在企业家 (控制性投资者 )道德风险的框架下 ,探讨了内部和外部控制系统及其整合对降低由投资者之间的利益冲突所产生的代理成本的作用。我们证明 ,外部控制系统的存在 ,将使内部控制系统的监督功能加强 ,从而使公司治理机制整体形成对企业家道德风险行为的有效约束。当企业家与分散投资者所签订的合约满足企业家激励相容约束条件时 ,内部和外部控制系统表现为互补关系 ;否则 ,只有外部控制系统发挥作用 ,而不需要引入内部控制系统。

This paper explores the function of integration of the internal and external control systems in mitigating the conflicts of interest among shareholders under the framework of entrepreneur (controlling investors) subject to moral hazard. We show that the existence of external control system would enhance the monitoring function of the internal control system, and as a result restrain the moral hazard behaviors of the entrepreneur. The relationship between the internal and external control system is not the simple monotonic one, which is different from the traditional viewpoints of corporate governance literature. The transfer from one relationship to another one depends on whether the entrepreneur's incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied by the contracts between the entrepreneur and the dispersed shareholders.