摘要
滨州案例表明,外部干预会使问题银行积聚很大的风险,政府一定要避免越位干预;但当问题银行的风险集中释放暴露时,政府要敢于及早负责、切断恐慌的传染源,因为金融稳定产生的社会效益会高于政府的投入。
The case of Binzhou indicates that exterior interference will make problem banks accumulate great risks, so governments should not exceed their duties to interfere into banks. However, when risks of problem banks are massively exposed, governments should actively take responsibility as early as possible, and cut off the source of contagion, because the social benefit produced by financial stability is higher than the government' s input.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期136-142,共7页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
金融稳定
政府成本
社会效益
financial stability
government cost
social benefit