两厂商情形下二度价格歧视的纳什均衡

Nash Equilibrium of Second Degree Price Discrimination under Two Manufacturers

基于线性需求函数对有市场竞争的厂商在实行二度价格歧视时的限制条件进行了分析。将其抽象为一个完全信息静态模型,由此分别对两厂商在三段定价和n段定价的二度价格歧视下所能进行的需求区间分段方式进行了研究,得出了完全不同于一个垄断厂商实行价格歧视时需求区间须等分才能获取消费量最大剩余的结论。同时指出,模型的纳什均衡的存在依赖于各厂商的市场占有率,只有在两厂商市场占有率接近时,两厂商才可能同时获取消费者最大剩余。

Based on the linear demand functions, the paper analyzes the limits of applying seconddegree price discrimination under the market competition, which is generalized as a complete static information model. It further studies the method of dividing demand intervals under the seconddegree price discrimination of three sectional pricing and n sectional pricing, Thus, a quite different conclusion is obtained, which is the opposite to what people hold that the consumers' maximum surplus can be only obtained by one monopolist equally dividing demand intervals under the condition of applying price discrimination. In case of one manufacturer applying price discrimination, it should divide the demand section equally. While in case of two manufactures; a quite different conclusion is obtained. It also proposes that the existence of Nash equilibrium depends on the market shares of each manufacture. Only in case that there is almost no great different ratio of market shares for two manufacturers, can both the manufacturers obtain the consumers' maximum surplus at the same time.