摘要
构造了一个可转换债券契约的信号传递博弈模型。在该模型中,创业者拥有信息优势,他们在开始签订投资契约时已知投资项目的状态信息,而风险投资者不知道,创业者可以通过转换价格向风险投资者传递项目的状态信息。研究结果表明,高水平的创业者会选择较高的转换价格,而低水平的创业者则会选择较低的转换价格,风险投资者可以根据可转换债券的转换价格将不同水平的创业者区别开来。可转换债券的这种甄别功能能够减轻风险资本市场中的逆向选择问题。
Convertible securities are prevalent instruments in developed venture capital markets.A signaling game model of convertible debt contracts is built in this paper. In this model, the entrepreneur has information advantage and he knows the state of enterprise which venture capitalist does not when contracting initially. The entrepreneur can signal the information of the enterprise by the conversion price. The study proves that an entrepreneur with high quality will select a higher conversion price than an entrepreneur with low quality. Therefore, venture capitalists can filter out high quality entrepreneurs from low quality ones by conversion price. The screening function of convertible debt could mitigate the adverse selection problems in venture capital markets.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
2003年第4期289-292,共4页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(70225002)
教育部跨世纪人才基金(9901)
教育部优秀青年教师奖励计划(001-28)
