摘要
指数国债是西方国家近年来兴起的新品种。国债余额中指数国债的合理数量决策取决于政府与投资者的动态博弈结果。文中建立了不同条件下指数国债数量决策的动态博弈模型,得到了时间一致、时间不一致,以及中央银行干预国债规模条件下指数国债的合理数量决策方法,研究表明,时间不一致条件下指数国债的合理数量多于时间一致条件下指数国债的合理数量,而引入财政部与中央银行通胀博弈,能够得到更为准确的指数国债合理数量,这将为我国引入指数国债提供了方法基础。
The indexed national bond is the new variety used recently in the western countries.The optimal quantity decision of indexed national bond in the total scale of national bonds depends on the dynamic games between the authority and investors.The paper has set up the dynamic game model for the quantity decision of indexed national bond and found the ways to make the quantity decision of indexed national bond on the condition of time consistence,time inconsistence and the interference of the Central Bank.It got the conclusion that the optimal quantity of the indexed national bond in the case of time inconsistence is more than that in the case of time consistence,in addition,the accurate quantity will be obtained if considering the game between Department of Finance and Central Bank.The above results will set the foundation for the introduction of the indexed nation bond in China.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2003年第6期1-4,共4页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(79790130)
关键词
指数国债
数量决策
模型
indexed national bond
quantity decision
game model