摘要
本文利用一个描述管理者收益效用的模型,试图说明:由于以追求控制权为偏好的管理者所得到的效用,与以追求企业绩效和价值为偏好、按照市场价格进行MBO的效用无差异。因此,管理者只有在收购价格低于企业价值的情况下,才会选择实施MBO。要引导国内的MBO走向规范的轨道,使其发挥价值创造的作用,除了制定、完善相应的法规,加强外部监督之外,更重要的是通过完善企业的激励机制,引导管理者的收益偏好,培育符合MBO资格的管理者,即具有企业家特征的管理者。
This paper use a model describing the manager' s profit and utility and try to demonstrate that the utility of the managers who pursue control right is in accordance with the utility of the managers who pursuit the value of the company and accept the market price carried in MBO. So, the managers merely choose to implement MBO only when the price lower than the value of the company. To guide the domestic MBO on the normal trajectory, besides formulating and consummating relevant laws and regulations , Strengthening the external monitoring , the more significant is to consummate the motivation mechanism and to guide the managers' utility partiality, breed the managers who have the entrepreneur' s feature and according with MBO qualification.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
2004年第1期62-65,共4页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business