电信网络互联定价的经济学分析

An Economic Analysis of Network Interconnection Pricing

在不存在价格规制条件下 ,当运营商非合作确定服务价格与互联价格时 ,由于运营商双边垄断地位造成价格双重加成 ,最终服务价格将超过垄断价格 ;当双方合谋时 ,由于消除了双重加成 ,厂商获取垄断利润。鉴于运营商垄断定价造成市场效率损失 ,要求实施价格规制。在规制定价条件下 ,社会福利最大化要求政府制定互联价格等于终接成本 。

Interconnection pricing that two asymmetric telecommunication networks decide in uncompetitive environment is considered here. Without price regulation, when interconnection charges are set in the non-cooperative way, market price is higher than monopoly price because of double marginalization.Carriers get monopoly profit when they collude. Price is regulated because of efficiency lose when price is set by carriers. Under price regulation, social welfare is maximized when interconnection fee equals access cost and market price equals cost that carriers understand.