对上市公司虚假信息审计失职的经济学分析

Economic Analysis on Dereliction of Audit in False Information Disclosure of Listing Company

本文用委托——代理模型和博奕模型分析了审计机构在上市公司虚假信息披露中的审计失职行为,发现审计机构追求短期利益是审计合谋的驱动力,并且与市场的状况有密切关系。只有在执法有效、讲究信誉的市场中,审计机构才会放弃对短期利益的追求。

This paper analyses dereliction of audit in false information disclosure of listing company by trust-agency model and game model. We find that the pursue to benefits of short-term is incentive of auditconspiracy, and that it has close relation to the market situation. Only when in the market with good credit and law environment, would audit institution give up the benefits of short - term.