开放式基金的治理结构问题研究

A structural study of the management of the open funding

有效的治理结构有益于防范道德风险,不同的委托代理方式对防范道德风险具有一定的作用和意义。我国目前开放式基金的治理结构中存在的问题:一是存在着内部人控制;二是基金持有人利益代表缺位。因此,我国基金业隐含着较大的道德风险。我国基金治理结构的改进:一是构建以"受托人委员会"为核心的治理结构;二是处理好独立董事、受托人与托管人之间的关系;三是避免基金当事人之间的"共谋",即建立相应的利益—风险机制。

As an effective managerial structure is believed to reduce moral vulnerabilities, various kinds of trusteeship may as well help prevent from committing them. The writer of the paper assumes that the weaknesses in the existing management of the open funding are either the interior control, or the absence of the beneficiary, which may implicate the greater moral vulnerabilities in the funding business of China. On basis of this, proposals are put forward to improve the managerial structure of the funding business. First, trustee committee should be set up as the core of the managerial structure. In addition, the relationship should be handled well between the board, the trustees and the entrusted. Moreover, a warning system known as vulnerability mechanism should be established so as to prevent the potential conspiracy of the partners concerned.