信息约束下的金融监管与银行声誉

Financial Supervision and Bank Reputation Under the Restriction of Asymmetric Information

如何在信息不对称的约束条件下降低金融风险、提高监管绩效,是金融监管中的一项重要课题。本文分析了信息结构对于监管的重要性,认为声誉机制的建立可以降低银行与监管部门之间信息不对称的程度和风险发生的概率,并运用KMFW模型,分析了不对称信息下银行声誉机制减少违规动机的过程,指出应该注重激励相容的制度安排,将外部监管与自律有机结合起来,促使银行自发选择接受监管且减少进行高风险投资的动机,这是信息不对称条件下提高监管效率的重要策略。结合我国实情,本文提出可通过银行风险评级、建立可置信的惩罚机制、完善银行内部治理机构、改进监管人员激励约束机制、构建和完善金融监管信息系统等措施,建立健全银行声誉机制,以进一步改善监管绩效。

It is an important topic how to reduce financial risk and enhance the performance of financial supervision. Through an analysis of the importance of informational structure to the supervision, this paper argues that the establishment of reputation mechanism may be conducive to reducing the extent of informational asymmetry between the bank and its supervision sectors as well as the probability of risk occurrence, pointing out that that one of the key approaches is to attach importance to the inspiring and compatible institutional arrangement, combining the outer supervision and self-discipline as an organic whole so as to urge the bank to accept spontaneously the supervision decrease its motivation of high-risky investment. Finally, in the light of our country's reality, the paper puts forward some effective measures to the improvement of the mechanism.