证券民事诉讼中共同诉讼机制的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Joinder Mechanism in Securities Civil Actions

随着我国资本市场的迅速发展,上市公司侵犯投资者利益的问题变得日益突出,证券民事诉讼越来越多。运用博弈论的方法,建立了证券民事诉讼中的共同诉讼机制博弈模型,并进行了纳什均衡的求解,最后进行了讨论并得出了如果所有投资者都是散户投资者,由于诉讼收益小于诉讼成本,则没有投资者提起共同诉讼;如果投资者中有一个以上的机构投资者且其诉讼收益大于诉讼成本,则机构投资者愿意提起共同诉讼的结论。因此建议大力发展机构投资者。

With the rapid development of our country's capital market, the problems of public company infringing investor's benefit become increasingly prominent and the securities civil actions appear more and more.This discourse utilize the method of game theory,build game model about the joinder mechanism in securities civil actions, find out the nash equilibrium, discuss thoroughly finally and conclude that if all the investors are individual, nobody will institute joinder because that the benift of lawsuit is less than the cost of lawsuit and if there are more than one institution investors whose benefit of lawsuit is more than the cost of lawsuit,the institution investor will institute joinder. So it's very necessary to develop institution investors.