摘要
斯蒂格利茨和韦斯 (1 981 )认为风险高的投资项目能够承受更高的贷款利率 ,所以当银行提高贷款利率时低风险的投资项目将会退出市场 ,而银行的最优选择是施行信贷配给。如果投资者可以等待关于其项目的信息充分披露从而项目的投资成功率更高时 ,高风险的投资项目将从等待中获得较大的收益 ,并只能承受相对较低的贷款利率 ,从而信贷配给在一定程度上得到消除。
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)believe that projects with higher risk have higher reservation imterest rates. When banks raise the lending rate' some investors with low-risk projects will robably drop out of the loan market, and it is opimal of banks to ration credit demand. This paper indicates that when investors have the choice to wait to invest so they may get more information about their projects, investors with risky projects have a greater return from waiting. More risky projects have lower reservation interest rates and in some dwegree the credit rationing equilibrium is resolved.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2004年第6期115-117,共3页
Commercial Research
