官僚组织、交易费用和区别性组合:新的思路被引量：12

Bureaus, Transaction Costs and Discriminating Alignment: A New Approach

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摘要运用交易费用经济学、公共行政学和公共选择的最新研究成果,该文挑战了目前公共行政学和公共选择研究中存在的一个非常隐蔽的假定,即假定所有的公共官僚机构都是相同的。该文呼吁重视各个公共官僚机构之间的差别,并在公共行政学中利用交易费用经济学所主张的“区别性组合”的逻辑来重新思考公共行政学的问题,尤其是选择管理模式的问题。 Utilizing the latest findings of public administration, public choice, and transaction cost economics, this paper challenges a hidden assumption of public administration and economics of bureaucracy, i. e. , the assumption that all bureaus are the same. This paper further argues for taking a serious consideration on the difference among bureaus, and suggests applying discriminating alignment of transaction cost economics to rethink many issues in public administration, especially choices on governance structure and management system.

作者马骏

机构地区中山大学行政管理研究中心

出处《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第2期7-11,共5页 Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基金 "教育部人文和社会科学研究2002年度重点项目"(02JAZ810006)阶段性成果

关键词官僚组织交易费用区别性组合 bureau transaction cost discriminating alignment

分类号 D035 [政治法律—政治学]

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参考文献11

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二级参考文献11

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