转轨时期国有企业“预算软约束”命题的一个实证研究

On the Soft Budget Constraint During the Transition Course:Positive Research

转轨时期政府供给的“拨改贷” ,“放权让利 ,”“承包制度” ,“转换经营机制” ,“建立现代企业制度”等创新制度旨在通过成本约束机制提高国有企业的资金使用效率。但是现实的情况表明 ,转轨时期 ,国有企业和国有银行之间残缺的债务债权关系使“公地悲剧”故事在信贷资金运行领域的凸现出来。创新制度的实行 ,并未使国有企业的行为方程符合创新制度供给者的主观模型 :预算软约束问题严重困扰着国有企业 。

In order to improve the efficiency of using the capit al through the constraint mechanism, the government has provided the new institu tion aiming at the stated-owned enterprise, such as from the free provisi on to commercial loan,granting autonomy and sharing profit,contract and lease transforming the management mechanism,constructing the modern enterprise insti tution and so on. We find out that the dilemmas on the commons presents i tself in the field of the using credit because of the misshapen properties betw een the stated-owned enterprise and bank.The enforcement of the new measure d id not make the action of the stated-owned enterprise according with the prel iminary matrix of the government, that is the problems obsessing the stated-ow ned enterprise all the same .just as before the transition.