轮流拍卖在公共资源配置中的应用——兼与讨价还价模型比较

Rotating Bidding: A Mechanism to Allocate Common Pool Resource,Comparing with Bargaining Solution

本文提出了一种将轮流拍卖应用于公共资源配置的机制。通过让最低标价的成员最先使用公共资源这样一种简单的配置办法，本文提出的新机制鼓励更有耐性的成员选择等待而得到更高回报，相对于平均分配和随机分配(抽签)。可以明显地提高资源的配置效率。本文还比较了在不同的环境参数下，第一价格拍卖规则和第二价格拍卖规则的有效性和适用性问题。这些结论同时也为特定环境下讨价还价和拍卖的比较提供一个研究思路。

This paper formalizes a rotating bidding mechanism for allocating the common pool resource (CPR) with the presence of private information.It is shown that through the competi- tion for the priority of using the CPR,the elaborated mechanism will motivate the agents to signal their time preferences and marginal costs in a Bayesian equilibrium,which ensures that people do not over-use the CPR and rewards the agents who have more patience and/or are more cost-effi- cient.Meanwhile,first and second pricing rules are both explored and compared for social and in- dividual efficiency.The paper also compares the results of bargaining and the rotating bidding mechanism.