民企竞争贷款过程中行为扭曲的经济学分析

An Economic Analysis on Private Firms' Bias Behavior in the Process of Competition for Loan

现有的融资制度下,国有企业相对于民营企业具有融资上的制度禀赋优势,这导致了民营企业在与国有企业竞争贷款资源过程中的扭曲行为。本文运用两期模型证明了这一命题,并且认为,如果不提高贷款机构对借款人使用贷款行为的监督能力,单纯强调政企分开并不能解决民营企业竞争贷款过程中的行为扭曲问题。

In the current institutional framework of funding, state-owned firms are institutionally predominant to private firms, which results in private firms' bias behavior when they compete with state-owned firms for loan. This paper tends to prove the proposition through a 2-period model and argues that, without enhancing the banks' capability of monitoring, to emphasis the separation between government and state-owned firms will not solve the problem of private firms' bias behavior.