走私与反走私的经济学分析

Economic Analysis on Smuggling and Anti-smuggling

消费者追求消费者剩余的增加而需求走私产品;走私人追求走私的巨大额外收益而产生走私行为;走私人与海关及其人员间存在博弈,稽查率和罚款率对走私产生重大影响;海关及其人员和地方政府与中央政府间存在委托 代理关系而产生寻租行为,推动了走私更加猖獗。针对走私的这些原因,必须采取相应的政策以有效反走私。同时,由于反走私必须付出成本,政府完全消除走私也并非最优选择,确定一个最优走私水平是现实的选择。

Smuggling products appear as a result of consumers' pursuit of consumer residue the act of smuggling happens because smugglers pursuit the huge additional profits; there is a game between smugglers and customs; the checking rate and fining rate exert great impact on smuggling. As there is a trust and agent relationship among customs, local government and central government, seeking rent practice occurs, and this encourages smuggling. Therefore, the corresponding anti-smuggling policy must be adopted. Because it costs a lot to fight against smuggling, it is not the best choice for government to wipe out smuggling. The practical choice is to set an optimum smuggling level.