摘要
In a symmetric affiliated value model, this paper analyses High-Technology industrial firms’ competitive strategy in research and development. (R&D). We obtain the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium functions with or without government’s prize: b1(x)=v(x,)Fn-1 (y∣y), and b3(x)= . We find the firm’s investment level will increase in prize, only when the constant prize V0≥v(y,y) , does the firm invest more aggressively with constant prize than with variable prize. Key words affiliated value - Bayesian Nash solution - prize CLC number O 29 - F 224.3 Biography: Che Ka-jia (1954-), female, Ph. D candidate, research direction: financial mathematics and business administration.
In a symmetric affiliated value model, this paper analyses High-Technology industrial firms’ competitive strategy in research and development. (R&D). We obtain the symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium functions with or without government’s prize: b1(x)=v(x,)Fn-1 (y∣y), and b3(x)= . We find the firm’s investment level will increase in prize, only when the constant prize V0≥v(y,y) , does the firm invest more aggressively with constant prize than with variable prize. Key words affiliated value - Bayesian Nash solution - prize CLC number O 29 - F 224.3 Biography: Che Ka-jia (1954-), female, Ph. D candidate, research direction: financial mathematics and business administration.
