摘要
有不少的科学哲学家支持基础主义、实在论和本质主义 ,上个世纪盛行一时的分析哲学为这几个学说提出了新的论据 ,强化了科学家本有的认识 ,相信科学以独立而零碎的经验充当证据 ,借此揭示存于心外之各种现象的本质。后现代主义者反对这种认识 ,于是向上述三个学说发动总攻击。面对这个情况 ,作者提出了三个论点 :(一 )认识科学主要在于认识科学方法 ,归纳法是主要的科学方法 ,没有一个较好的认识 ,就难以正确地认识科学。 (二 )一些典型的分析哲学家支持基础主义、实在论和本质主义 ,遭到后现代主义者的批判 ;然而 ,彼此之间的论争纵使决出胜负 ,也动摇不了归纳法。 (三 )说明归纳法与说明其他的科学理论一样 ,都以经验为据 ,没有经验以外的哲学论据可与媲美 ,这正是自然主义的立场。本文集中讨论了第二点。
Foundationalism, realism and essentialism lend support to the view that mind-independent objects are knowable to the scientists who base their beliefs on bits and pieces of data taken as evidence. Post-modernists have found the three bases fallacious. As a result, they also cast doubt on the view mentioned above. Accordingly, science may not be as objective and therefore as respectable as we would like it to be. However, I doubt if the post- modernists have made a case. My argument is as follows. First of all, I take it that the question of scientific objectivity is to be tied to the question on whether the methods of science are valid. Secondly, the post-modernists may have repudiated foundationalism, realism and essentialism, but not the validity of the scientific methods, such as induction. Therefore, the question of whether science is objective is yet to be settled in light of the criticisms made by the post modernists. My article focuses on the second point.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期36-40,共5页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature