摘要
As a central content of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, the importance of pre-predictive experience consists in, through back to “pre-predictive experience”, justifying those “doxa” without yet being theorized and being systemized, and thus founding predictive experience and judgement evidently. This theory is concerned with problems, such as the evidence of judgment, the mode in which the perceptible object explicates, fulfilling the meaning of perceptible object, and typing apperception of object.
As a central content of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, the importance of pre-predictive experience consists in, through back to “pre-predictive experience”, justifying those “doxa” without yet being theorized and being systemized, and thus founding predictive experience and judgement evidently. This theory is concerned with problems, such as the evidence of judgment, the mode in which the perceptible object explicates, fulfilling the meaning of perceptible object, and typing apperception of object.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第3期29-37,共9页
Philosophical Research
