摘要
经理股票期权(ESO)在西方是一种重要的长期激励工具,目前国内也对其十分重视.尽管ESO在减少股东对经理的监督成本以及经理行为长期化方面发挥着重要作用,但它并非对代理人总是有很好的激励状态,其效率随诸多因素变动.本文借助一个不对称信息契约模型,反映了经理股票期权的应用效率.
Executive stock options (ESO) is one of the most important long-term incentive tools. ESO plays very crucial roles in decreasing the cost to monitor executive for shareholders and guiding executive's behavior towards company's long-term benefits. However, it is not always appropriate to motivate executives because there are many factors to affect its efficiency. By an asymmetry information contract model, the ESO's efficiency in application was analyzed.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第3期340-343,共4页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
关键词
经理股票期权
不对称信息
契约模型
效率
executive stock option
asymmetry information
contract model
efficiency
