公司控制权内部分配博弈分析

A Game Analysis on Corporation Control Interior Assignment

采用完全信息动态博弈研究了公司治理中公司控制权内部分配模型,在理论上分析并得出了公司控制权在股东、经理和员工三者之间进行分配的可能最优解.为解决现代公司治理中,由于"两权"分离后所造成的企业经理内部人控制、专有性人力资本承担了公司长期风险却没有或很少有控制权导致的投入不足等弊病提供了一条思路.

The paper studied a model on corporation control interior assignment by employing a dynamic game of complete information. It theoretically analyzed and gained the possible maximum of the corporation control how to assign among stockholders, managers and employees. A series of problems caused by the separation of the ownership and proprietor, such as interior control and bankruptcy risk aroused by employee's exclusive capital, may be solved.