基于委托-代理模型的虚拟企业控制权最优分配

Research on the Optimal Control Power Structure of Virtual Enterprise

虚拟企业是由许多非产权统一的企业基于市场机遇通过契约的方式组建起来的,因此盟主企业和伙伴企业之间存在着严重的信息不对称问题,很大程度上影响了虚拟企业的高效运作.而控制权结构的安排有助于盟主企业控制组织风险,激励伙伴企业为整个虚拟企业倾注努力.据此,借用委托-代理模型,从风险和激励的角度分两种情况综合研究了盟主企业和伙伴企业的重要性对比关系,求解了虚拟企业最优控制权的配置.

Based on the marketable opportunity, virtual enterprise (VE) is organized by some individual and competitive companies via contracts. So there exists serious asymmetrical information problem between core company and cooperation companies, which is the key internal factor for the high failure rate of VE. But the control power structure is a way to deal with this problem. This article structured a model of control power structure on the basis of principal-agency theory in VE, considering two conditions: whether there are cooperation between cooperation companies or not in order to design an optimal control power structure on the basis of equilibrium between the effort's benefit and the cost.