甄别、审查和消费信贷研究

Research on Screening, Monitoring and Consumer Credit

基于目标规划及博弈论等原理,对贷款申请者的事前甄别和事后审查进行建模分析以降低银行不能收回贷款的风险.结果表明,当贷款规模相对审查成本偏小时(如消费信贷),贷款人为了收回没有偿还的贷款而采取成本高昂的审查行动可能存在一定的困难,因此审查的决策必须是事后最优的;通过事前对贷款申请人进行甄别,贷款人能够降低借款人不能还款的概率,并且也能降低借款人能偿还借款但选择不偿还借款的概率.在一个竞争性的环境中,甄别成本可通过较高的贷款利率被转移到借款人.

This paper constructed a model to analyze ex-ante screening of loan applicants and ex-post auditing in order that banks reduce the risk that loans are not reimbursed. When the loan size is small with respect to the audit cost as in consumer credit, lenders may have difficulty in undertaking costly actions to recover unpaid bills. That is, the monitoring must be ex-post optimal. By screening loan applicants ex-ante, lenders reduce the probability that the borrower cannot pay and reduce as well the probability that the borrower chooses not to pay when he can repay. In a competitive environment screening costs are passed along to borrowers through higher interest rates.