腐败根源的公共经济学分析

Analysis of the Causes of Corruption Generation in the View of Public Sector Economics

从公共经济学意义上来说,作为经济人的政府官员,在拥有公共权力和寻租空间的情况下,只要从事腐败活动的收益大于成本,腐败的产生就不可避免。中国正处于体制转轨的关键时刻,转轨本身产生出过多的任意处置权和寻租空间。由于任意处置权这种公共权力的存在和寻租空间的扩大,导致腐败的现实成本和机会成本都很低,这就造成了日益猖獗的腐败行为。对腐败的治理,需要从各个可能方面阻止腐败产生条件的发生,进而在一定程度上消除其产生的根源,从而最大限度地杜绝腐败。

In terms of Public Sector Economics, governmental mandarins are the economic men. If the profit of corruption is higher than the cost, mandarins who have public power and the space of seeking rent would be corrupted. China is now at a critical moment of system transition, and the transition itself has created too many chances for arbitrary power practice and the space of seeking rent. As the public power's existence and the extension of the space of seeking rent, both the real cost and the chance cost are rather low, and this has caused corruption actions. As for the corruption harness, we may hold up the factors of corruption in every possible way, then eliminate the causes of corruption generation to some extent. In a word, limit the rate of corruption to the least. 