“批对批”供应链在信息不对称下的协调机制

Coordination Mechanism in a Lot-for-Lot Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

由一个供应商和一个分销商组成的二级供应链系统,当该系统面对单品种的确定性外部需求时,首先给出了能够激励自私的供应链成员实现供应链联合最优的合作协调机制;在分销商的存贮费为不对称信息的情况下,分析了上述机制的局限性,并运用激励理论,提出激励供应链成员诚实申报信息的新的协调机制,实现了供应链系统的联合最优化。

In a cooperative 2-echelon lot-for-lot supply chain system under constant demand, the supply chain partners including a supplier and a retailer, are all selfish profit-maximizing firms. So the cooperative coordination mechanism, to realize the whole optimization of members in supply chain, is proposed. Under the environment of asymmetric storage cost information, this mechanism is invalid and a new information revelation mechanism is proposed by use of principle/agency theory which results in the optimization of supply chain system.