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银行监管的博弈分析

Banking Supervision:A Game Analysis
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摘要 采取何种监管思想来指导监管实践 ,解决商业银行要求金融自由化、放宽金融监管与防范、化解日益增长的金融风险之间的矛盾 ,是刚刚成立的银监会的首要问题。从博弈论的角度出发 ,认为在现阶段尽管监管成本很高 ,但严加监管仍是银监会的最优选择。 It is a primary task for the newly-established Banking Supervisory Commission (BSC) to adopt what kind of supervisory thought to guide its supervisory practice so as to solve the contradiction between commercial banks' demand for financial liberalization and less financial control and governmental duty of guarding against and defusing the growing financial risks. Viewed from the game theory, it is argued that strict supervision is still the best option open to the BSC in spite of its high cost.
出处 《西安石油大学学报(社会科学版)》 2004年第1期30-33,共4页 Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition
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参考文献2

  • 1[1]陈学彬.博弈学习理论[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998.
  • 2谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,1998..

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