摘要
由于体制和历史等原因,我国上市公司中,除了考虑管理层和股东之间的冲突外,更重要的是控制股东和中小股东之间的利益冲突。在这种情况下,最佳公司治理实践就与保护中小股东的利益紧密相联。
This paper is an analysis of the relation of private interest resulted from supervision by majority shareholders, social interest generated by the equity structure and cost of equity concentration. Studies reveal that equity concentration could generate enormous social interest at great conflicts of interest between shareholders and corporate management only if other corporate governance system remains fragile. This result provides a great enlightenment to policy making on reform of equity structure in China.
出处
《证券市场导报》
北大核心
2004年第3期34-39,共6页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家社科基金项目(02BJY127)资助
中流文教基金会资助
喜玛拉雅研究发展基金会(大陆青年学者基础研究资助)资助