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基于消费者柔性行为的两部定价研究 被引量:11

The Two-part Pricing under Consumers' Flexible Behaviors
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摘要 在指出现有研究两部定价文献的缺陷 (即只考虑消费者的短期行为 )的基础上 ,建立消费者消费的柔性模型 ,进而得到相应的均衡 ,并给出此均衡的特征 .在考虑消费者对未来消费的柔性时 ,其保留效用低于经典假设中的保留效用 ,因此 ,拓展了厂商决策的可行空间 .当边际价格随着影响消费者决策的参数变化时 ,固定费用也相应的发生变化 .最后证明了在两部定价下 ,不同的固定费用可以用于甑别消费者的类型 ,从而激励相容约束得以满足 . Based on the recognition of defects (i.e. the hypothesis of consumers′ short-term ration) in the literatures on two-part tariff,we model consumer′s long-run ration,derive the monopolistic pricing equilibrium,and study the features in the equilibrium. Under consumer′s flexibility,his (or her) retained utility is lower than that in classical models,that is,consumer′s flexibility expands firm′s decision space. The marginal price changes with the change of parameters that influence consumers′ decision,and the fixed fee changes correspondently. Finally,we prove that the deferent fixed fees can be used to identify deferent types of consumers and the incentive compatible constraint is still satisfied.
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2004年第3期15-20,共6页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 教育部博士点基金 (2 0 0 3 0 61 40 1 1 ) 国家杰出青年科学基金 (7972 5 0 0 2 ) 电子科技大学青年科技基金
关键词 实物期权理论 消费者 柔性行为 经济学 两部定价理论 委托-代理问题 flexibility profit maximization the exercising cost the participation constraint the incentive compatible constraint
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