摘要
我国现行养老保险制度面临着严重资金短缺的困境 ,通过政府和企业之间的两阶段完全信息动态博弈分析 ,揭示了这种现象的深层制度根源 ,并探讨改进政府和企业之间的低效率博弈均衡的途径 。
The pension insurance system in China is encountering fund deficit problem. This paper attempts to explain the institutional background of the problem through a two-stage game analysis. The analysis is followed by some policy suggestions.
出处
《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》
2004年第2期45-49,共5页
Journal of Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management
