基于博弈论的发电厂商竞价策略研究

Research on competing price strategies of power plants based on game theory

利用博弈论方法在比较宽泛的假设条件下建立了发电厂商的竞价策略模型.研究结果表明,当电量市场需求小于等于每个发电厂商的申报上网电量时,发电厂商的最优报价将围绕其单位发电成本与电力市场最高限价之间的平均值小幅波动;当电力市场存在相对垄断的发电厂商时,非垄断厂商会以单位发电成本报价来博取上网售电机会,而相对垄断厂商会利用其发电主导地位提高边际上网电价;当电量市场需求大于每个发电厂商的申报上网电量而小于所有发电厂商申报上网电量之和时,若不受管制,双方出价将趋于无穷大,若受管制,每个发电厂商的最优均衡报价可能是下列三者之一:该发电厂商的单位发电成本、市场最高限价以及单位发电成本与市场最高限价之间的某中间值.

This paper constructs a competing price strategy model of power plants based on the method of game theory. The result shows that when the power market demand is less than or equal to supply of every power plant, the optimal quoted price of every power plant is close to the average value between its unit generation cost and the greatest limited price; when there exist the relatively monopoly power plants in power market, the optimal quoted price strategies of non-monopoly power plants are that their quoted price is equal to their unit generation cost and the relatively monopoly power plants will increase the marginal power price according to their interest; and when the power market demand is greater than supply of every power plant and less than the sum of supplies of all power plants, if the power price is not constrained, the quoted price of all power plants will tend to be infinite, and if the power price is constrained, the optimal equilibrium quoted price of every power plant could be one of the following: its unit generation cost and a greatest limited price and a certain value between them.