公司治理机制对总经理报酬影响之实证研究

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance for CEO'S Payment Mechanism in Chinese Listed Corporations

委托———代理理论对经营者报酬问题的研究 ,着重于董事会作用下的报酬机制。在不设立专门的报酬委员会时 ,董事会决定报酬的行为事实上依赖于公司所有权结构。所以具体的报酬方案是经营者与治理因素博弈的结果。通过公司治理因素与总经理报酬关系的实证研究 ,探求我国上市公司治理机制对总经理报酬的解释力。

In the theory of Principal and Agent, the research on the payment of operators focuses on the payment incentive mechanism for CEO's decided by the board. The board decides the payment for CEO's, which relies on the ownership of the corporation. So, the scheme of payment is the result of the game between operators and governance determinants. This paper analyzes the relationship between governance determinants and the payment for CEO's, and probes into how corporate governance mechanism influences the CEO's payment in listed corporations.