演化多重少数者博弈模型中的合作效应

Cooperation in the evolutionary multiple-choice minority game

提出并研究了演化多重少数者博弈模型.在该模型中经纪人在每时步根据自己的策略选择多方中的一方.每个经纪人拥有一个几率p值,在作选择时以几率p采用自己的最佳策略,以几率1-p采用自己的最差策略.一旦经纪人的财富低于某个给定的值d (d<0)则改变自己的p值.数值模拟结果显示,引入演化后,经纪人之间的协作性明显增强.

The evolutionary multiple-choice minority game is investigated. In the model, every agent chooses one side out of N_c sides. Each agent is assigned a single number p(0≤p≤1), with it he chooses his best (success) strategy of his s strategies, while 1-p is the probability he will choose his worst strategy. Once the (agent's) wealth falls below a value d(d<0), then his p value is modified on the old p, with a width equal to R. Numerical results show that the evolution can considerably enhance the system's coordination.