期刊文献+

风险投资的道德风险控制—报酬激励机制设计

On Moral Risk Control of Risk Investment and Reward Inspiration Mechanism
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摘要 风险企业家发生道德风险的根本动机是利益驱动 ,通过对股份收益报酬制度和经理股票期权制度的分析 ,推导出一种适合风险投资行业特性的报酬激励机制。 The ultimate motivation of the venture entrepreneurs falling into moral risk is the profit. The article deduces a payment encouraging mechanism suiting for characteristics of venture capital by analyzing stock revenue system and executive options.
作者 杨波 李涛
机构地区 宜宾学院 四川大学
出处 《成都理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2004年第1期59-61,共3页 Journal of Chengdu University of Technology:Social Sciences
关键词 风险投资 道德风险 报酬激励机制 风险控制 企业管理 利益驱动 venture capital moral hazard payment mechanism incentive
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