基于网络外部性的企业技术标准控制策略

Control strategy to technology standard of firm based on network externality

研究具有网络外部性特征的市场中,拥有主流技术标准的主导厂商对其技术标准的控制策略.结果表明,在从属厂商技术联盟等联合反击行为的影响下,网络外部性的强弱以及厂商的用户基础规模决定了主导厂商的策略选择.只有网络外部性较弱而且主导厂商的用户规模优势较大时,主导厂商才会独占技术标准;当网络外部性较强或者主导厂商的用户基础优势相对较小时,主导厂商应全面开放或者仅对部分厂商开放技术标准.若政府强制主导厂商实行非歧视性的技术标准控制策略,则可能会损害社会福利.

The paper analyzes how the dominant producer, to control its technology standard which is mainstream in the market which the network externality exists. The results show that the intensity of network externality and scale of the installed base have great influence on the decision of the dominant producer when the dominant producer faces the threat of the cooperative behavior of the fringes. Only if network externality is small and the scale of installed base of the dominant producer is large, the dominant producer should monopolize its standard. And when the network externality is large or the scale of installed base of the dominant producer is small, the dominant producer should fully or targetedly open its standard. When the government orders the dominant producer shouldn't open targetedly its standard, the social welfare might be impaired.