融资方式:自由资本约束和资产替代行为——对可转债融资方式的分析

Financing Method:Capital Constraint and Asset Substitution——Through Analyzing Convertible Bonds' Case

用建立一个模型来具体分析直接融资下可转换公司债券对负债契约中股东与债权人利益冲突,特别是股东的资产替代行为的回避,以及可转换公司债券的发行对企业融资形态选择过程中自有资本约束的影响。通过对企业不发行可转换公司债券和全额发行可转换公司债券两种融资方式下企业自有资本约束和资产替代可能性区域的比较得出:可转换公司债券融资方式对企业的自有资本要求比不发行可转换公司债券直接融资时要高,并且可转换公司债券融资方式下资产替代可能性区域比不发行时大大减小,能有效地回避股东的资产替代道德风险行为。

A model is built to explain how the convertible bonds avoid the conflicts between stockholders and creditors, especially the asset substitution behavior of stockholders, and the influence of convertible bonds to owned capital constraint. Comparing the two situations which is for enterprise to issue and not to issue convertible bonds, we can draw a conclusion that : It is more strictly constrained for enterprise to finance through convertible bonds than no convertible bonds; moreover through convertible bonds the probability area of asset substitution is been largely decreased ,so it can effectiaely avoid the moral hazard of asset substitution from stockholders.