非对称信息条件下的企业人力资源规划研究

Study of Enterprise Human Resources Programming under Asymmetric Information

本论文针对企业管理中存在的员工工作表现难考核和信息不对称的问题,提出企业首先要根据各类职务的工作性质制定出可量化的标准(合理)的工作绩效水平,其次在信息不对称的情况下,考虑管理成本的节约,建立博弈模型,最后得出企业应选取的最优监督概率和员工的违规概率,据此采取相应的策略以取得最好的经济效益。

Focusing on the difficulties in appraising employees' performance and asymmetric information, the following opinions are expressed in this article. First, the enterprise should set a quantifiable and reasonable working performance standard for working quality of various jobs. Second, where the asymmetric information is concerned,it should consider the saving of the overhead,the setting of the game model. Last, the optimized supervision likelihood and the employees' violation likelihood should be chosen, and the corresponding strategy should be taken to get the maximum result.