收费公路和公共交通之间的定价博弈分析

Fare competition between highway and public transport

研究了收费公路和公共交通的定价博弈问题 .运用博弈论的模型和方法 ,在自由竞争和充分合作的情况下分别建立了两者间的定价模型 ;探讨了在自由竞争的情况下公路收费和公交票价达到的均衡状态 ,以及在多种政府政策下均衡状态的变化 ,同时分析了运营者相互合作下的公路收费和公交票价 .结论表明 ,在自由竞争的情况下 ,政府税收对最优均衡定价没有影响 ,在固定出行需求的情况下 ,政府对公交进行补贴会导致两者的定价上升 .

Based on the game theory, the pricing model between the two commuting modes is proposed separately for the case of competition and cooperation. The equilibrium prices are thus obtained. The variation of equilibrium prices under different government decisions is analyzed in the complete competition. Moreover the relationship between highway toll and public transport fare is discussed under the case of cooperation. The conclusions obtained show that the government tax has no impact on the equilibrium pricing under the competitive case, and the transfer of tax from highway to public transport will unexpectedly lead to the rise of the equilibrium pricing when the fixed commuting demand is assumed.