摘要
产权理论是第一个关于不完全合约和企业合并的正式模型,其核心内涵是说明在不完全合约和潜伏着"敲竹杠"问题的环境中,非人力资产所有权如何影响交易参与人的关系专用性投资。通过考察该理论的基本假设和概念框架发现,它不能对企业边界的决定提供恰当的和充分的解释。企业不仅仅是解决"敲竹杠"问题的机制,合并也不是解决"敲竹杠"问题的惟一途径。
The theory of property-rights is the first formal model concerning incomplete contract and firm integration. It focuses on how ownership of non-human assets influences relationship-specific investments in a world of incomplete contracting and potential hold-ups. It give much too limitation of a view of the determination of the firm's boundaries. The firm has to deal with a much richer variety of problems than simply the resolution of hold-ups, and integration is not the only means to solve hold-ups.
出处
《太原理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2004年第1期24-27,51,共5页
Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)