不完全信息下基于成本的倾销反倾销静态博弈分析

Static Game of Dumping and Anti-dumping Under Incomplete Information

本文通过国内外企业及国内政府三者之间的不完全信息静态博弈分析,得出存在倾销和反倾销的情况下国内政府部门如何确定反倾销税率以使国内社会福利达到最大化;同时,根据博弈分析结果,得出在反倾销问题上国内外企业及国内政府拟采取的优化策略及为我国企业及政府未来的倾销反倾销策略提供了理论依据。

By means of analyzing gamely CournotBayes equilibrium of costbased dumping and antidumping among foreign enterprises、domestic enterprises and domestic government,concluded that domestic government how to determine the antidumping duty rate to maximize the domestic welfare;meanwhile concluded the optimal policies adopted by domestic government and export firms according to game analysis、provided domestic enterprises and domestic government with theoretical basis for their future best dumping and antidumping strategies.