战后初期美国在对外政策中的两党合作

Bipartisan Cooperation in American Foreign Policy in Early Postwar Years

本文的研究对象是第二次世界大战结束后初期美国在对外政策上两党合作的实践。两党合作的对外政策指的是在对外政策领域内 ,以总统为代表的行政部门同另一党的某些国会领袖以协商等形式进行的政策制订过程 ,其目的是为了最高的“国家利益”而将对党派私利的考虑排除在外 ,并使政策最终获得总统和国会两党多数的支持。第二次世界大战后 ,美国在对外政策上的两党合作始于创立联合国 ,并在此后确保了援助希腊、土耳其 ,马歇尔计划 ,以及建立北大西洋公约组织等一系列重大政策的成功。长期来看 ,两党合作的深层影响则是加强了冷战共识和行政部门权力的扩张 ,并在本质上与美国分权制衡的宪政原则相抵触。两党合作的外交政策在短时间内看是必要的和有益的 ,但也蕴藏着危险。

The thesis discusses the theory and practice of America's bipartisan foreign policy in the early postwar days. In the early postwar years, the major foreign policy decisions, including the setting up of the UN, the aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, etc., were all great achievements of bipartisan efforts. Bipartisanship won much applause due to the successful policies, and was to some degree sanctified since people believed it could bring to America unified, coherent and effective foreign policies in the face of external dangers. Meanwhile, in the long run the deeper influence of bipartisanship was reflected in the intensification of Cold War consensus and the expansion of executive power. A bipartisan foreign policy seemed to be necessary and useful in the short run, but the common illusion and the slogans about patriotism and national interest would easily stifle any criticism, ossify policy thinking, and result in great costs in the long run.