员工持股计划的委托—代理模型分析

The principal-agent model of ESOP

员工持股计划是目前企业广泛使用的长期激励手段.从委托—代理的经典模型出发,分别建立了上市企业未实施员工持股计划和实施员工持股计划时的委托—代理模型,对模型结论进行了比较分析,并分析了为达到最佳激励效果,企业给予员工的期权数目与企业规模、给予员工的奖金数量等因素的关系.

Now more and more enterprises have used ESOP to incentive their employees. The paper used Principal\|Agent theory as basic theory, set up the Principal\|Agent model about ESOP. Furthermore, the paper analyzed how to gain best incentive effects when enterprises both use ESOP and cash pay. The paper also analyzed the relationship between the best stock amount and enterprise's scale, the relationship between the best stock amount and the best bonus amount.