水电工程项目管理中的激励研究

Incentive in hydropower project program management

针对目前水电工程项目管理中激励弱化的现状,引入多任务委托———代理理论探讨加强激励的问题.结果表明:任务被观测的难易程度和任务间的成本关联性对合同中的激励因子有很大的影响.在此基础上获得了解决激励弱化问题的若干办法.

In the light of status quo about the weakened incentive in hydropower project program management, this thesis researches the problem of how to improve incentive from multi-task principal-agent theory. The conclusion shows that the level of job being observed and the relationship of cost between two jobs are critical in the incentive in contract. Based on the conclusion, we get several means to solve this problem.