论中国国企所有权安排的扭曲及改革建议

The Distortion of the Ownership Arrangement of China’s SOEs and the Reform Suggestions

“经营者持大股”是国有股权由政府代理向经济代理转变的逻辑演变的结果,是中国国有企业所有权安排的扭曲反映。它不仅带来更大的社会不公,而且导致大量的国有资产流失和弱化市场机制的作用。要想化解国有企业改革的“囚徒困境”,在维持目前国有企业所有权安排的条件下改革国有资产管理体制是徒劳的,可行的办法是将国有股权变为债权。

This paper holds that“manager—being—the—big—shares—holder”phenomenon is the logical result in the process of the state—owned shares being converted from government agent into economy agent .It is also the re-flection of the distorted ownership arrangement of SOEs.Not only does it bring about more social injustice,but also causes amount of loss of the state—owned assets and weakens the function of market mechanism.In order to resolve“the Prisoners’Dilemma ”in the reform of SOEs ,it is in vain to reform the management mechanism of the state—owned assets while maintaining present ownership arrangement of SOEs.A feasible measure is to transfer the state—owned shares into treasury bonds.