青木昌彦的制度观与制度演化的进化博弈思想评析

The Reviews On Aoki's View of Institution and Evolution Game Theory of Institutional Changes

青木昌彦对“制度是关于博弈重复进行的共有信念的自我维系系统”的概念来自于对制度系统的本质认识,这种概括超越了长期以来把制度简单分为几类并把制度描述为控制人类行为的规则和规范的简单界定。他不仅强调制度是一种规则,更强调制度是一种在动态演化基础上可自我实施的共有信念,他的制度概念更突出了制度的动态性和可实施性。青木昌彦的制度演化框架既包含了新制度经济学的现代经济学分析方法,又融入了演化经济学的结构分析方法,在古典博弈模型的基础上又引入进化博弈思想,并创造性地构建了内生的制度演化模型。他对制度演化分析的解释性明显好于现有的其它制度演化理论。当然,他的思想和模型也还没有达到十分完善的地步,在某些方面也还存在比较明显的问题。

Aoki's definition about institution,‘institution is a self-sustaining system of the common belief of repeating game’, is based on a deep understanding of the nature of institution. This generalization surpasses the long-standing simple classification and definition about institution. He not only emphasizes that institution is a type of rule but also regards it as a common belief which can be implemented by itself on the base of dynamic evolution. His view of institution gives more prominence to dynamic and executable nature of institution. Aoki's framework of institutional changes contains not only modern economic analysis methods of new institution economics but also structural analysis methods of evolution economics. On the base of classic game model he introduces evolution game theory and sets up an inner evolution model. His explanation is obviously superior to other theories of institutional evolution. Of course, his thoughts and model are not perfect, which still have obvious defects in some aspects.