我国职业体育市场委托-代理问题之研究

Research On Principal-agent Problem Of Chinese Professional Sport Market

运用西方经济学的理论,分析我国职业体育市场中的委托-代理关系及委托-代理问题的表现、基本模式和产生的原因,讨论了职业体育协会和职业体育俱乐部之间均衡合同的达成问题,用经济学原理构建了裁判员道德风险模型,并用经济学上的一般激励机制和我国职业体育市场上存在着特殊的激励约束机制分析了委托-代理问题。

Applying the knowledge of economics,the paper analyzes the basic modes of principal-agent relations and causes of principal-agent problems of Chinese professional sport market,discussesthe problems of the equilibrium contracts between professional sport association and professional sportclubs,constructs the referee's Moral Hazard Model under the economic principle.Principal-agent prob-lems are analyzed by applying common incentive systems and special incentive-constraint systems inChinese professional sport market.