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研究开发联盟中的控制权配置:中国制药产业的研究 被引量:5

Control Rights Allocation in R&D Alliance:Research of China's Pharmaceutical Industry
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摘要 本文以研发方议价能力为控制变量,以出资方在研发联盟中获得的相对控制权为因变量,对中国制药产业1999~2002年 102个有效研发联盟合约样本进行了研究,证明了阿吉恩和泰勒尔的两个假设:出资方议价能力越强,控制权越应配置给出资方;项目越处于研究开发的初始阶段,控制权越应分配给研发方。本研究还证明了出资方的实际出资额(技术价格)是决定控制权分配的更重要的因素。
作者 刘学 马宏建
出处 《数量经济技术经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第6期28-38,共11页 Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
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