摘要
通过建立两个码头之间的完全信息静态博弈模型和完全信息动态博弈模型分析了港口码头的重复建设现象。认为重复建设的根本原因在于各个港口对经济腹地的预测值偏高,港口之间缺乏协调合作,以致于在竞争中产生一种类似“囚徒困境”的心理。本文给出了解决港口码头重复建设问题的若干政策建议。
The phenomenon of repeated construction of port terminals is analyzed through establishing two game models, i.e. the static game model for complete information and the other is the dynamic game model for complete information. It is considered that the basic cause of the repeated construction lies in the higher predicted value of the hinterland area and lack of cooperation between ports. Thus two ports fall into the 'prisoner's dilemma'. Some suggestions on the policy for solving the problem of repeated construction of port terminals are put forward.
出处
《水运工程》
北大核心
2004年第4期40-42,共3页
Port & Waterway Engineering
关键词
港口
码头
重复建设
博弈
port
terminal
repeated construction
game
