跨国并购控制中冲突范围决定的经济学分析

An Economic Analysis about The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

通过对不同国家的并购管理机构在针对同一件法律问题进行处理时发生冲突的范围进行考察,可以发现,当经济的一体化程度很高的时候,跨国并购监管之间的冲突是很少发生的。所以,"全球化"实际上是减少而不是增加冲突的发生。此外,当国家大小悬殊或者针对市场独断的政策趋向于极端的时候,冲突同样很少发生。

Conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high after analyzing the scope of conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. Therefore, 'globalization' actually alleviates rather than exacerbates conflict. In addition, conflict is less likely to arise between countries with very different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.