摘要
串谋是一种重要的企业行为。本文分析了串谋的动因,并利用博弈论的方法,解释卡特尔的协议是不稳定的,串谋是很难成功的。最后针对串谋问题,提出“防共谋均衡”思想。
Collusion is a kind of important business behavior. This text analyzes the intention of collusion. Through using the method of policy decision, we explain that the agreement of cartel isn't stable and collusion is very difficult to succeed. At last,we put forward the thought of “coalition-proof equilibrium”in the light of collusion problem.
出处
《安徽工业大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2004年第3期257-260,共4页
Journal of Anhui University of Technology（Natural Science）
关键词
串谋
静态博弈
纳什均衡
利润最大化
collusion
static game
Nash equilibrium
the maximum of profit
